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DISGORGEMENT REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, technology and information-based industries transformed
the global culture and economy, ushering in what some have described as a
Golden Age for intellectual property.' "We've passed from an industrial economy
to an information economy, and information is the domain of intellectual
property. )12

Corporations today view intellectual property as an asset, filing more patents
as part of their business strategy than ever before. In fiscal year 2005, the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) received 406,302 patent applications, and granted
165,485.'
Patent protection is by no means a new concept, however. The first known
reference to a patent dates back to Aristotle's mention of rewards for those who
discover things useful to the state.4 And the Venetians are widely credited with
creating the first real patent system in the fifteenth century.' The Venetian
Senate's 1474 Act regulated the granting of patents by implementing many of the
6
same criteria that are still in effect today.
Another ancient tenet that remains ingrained in modem-day protection of
intellectual property is the tension between the protection of the individual
interest and the desire to serve the good of the community.7 While protecting an

' Karl F. Jorda, Intelkctual Property: New Factorof Production in the 21st Centuy Information &
Knowledge Protectedas IntellectualProper: Role in Economic, Soca Cultura4 & TechnologicalDevelopment,
PIERCE LAW IP MALL, Aug. 26-27,1999, http://www.ipmal.info/hosted-resources/pubspapers/
jorda_08_27-99.asp.
2 Meg J ones, Takes Five RichardPosner Impact ofIntellectualPropertyLaw Growing
MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 2005, at 2 (quoting Judge Richard Posner).
3 Press Release, USPTO Receives Record Number of Patent and Trademark
Applications for
2005 (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/05-52.htm.
4 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed.

1997).
s Id at 3.
6 Id. at 4. The Venetian code stated:
Be it enacted that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build
any new and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in this
Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare
Board when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and
operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and
towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to said one,
without the consent and license of the author, for the term of 10 years.
Id
Id.
at 2 (explaining that Aristotle believed "rewards to intdivduals can cause problems for the
state; in honoring one who discovers something new, the state may actually weaken itself'); see also
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13 (3d
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inventor's creation provides an incentive to engage in creative activity, it also
excludes others from using those ideas.' Ultimately, such protection prevents a
larger number of people from benefiting, at least for the duration of the patent
protection.'
With this paradox of community benefits versus individual interests in mind,
the English courts shifted the standard of what inventors were expected to
0
contribute to society in exchange for patent protection. These courts required
applicants to describe their invention clearly and completely and, thus, contribute
the technical know-how behind the patents and not just the product described
therein." Today, this notion is encompassed in the enablement requirement,
which stipulates that a patent applicant must describe 2his invention "in such a way
as to enable others to make and use the invention."'
To emphasize the importance of this contribution of inventors' knowledge to
society in exchange for the powerful monopolies granted to patent holders, U.S.
Patent law expressly imposes a "duty of candor and good faith" on everyone
3
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application.' This duty lasts
throughout the entire prosecution of an application and applies to all dealings
with the PTO. 4 When patent applicants breach the duty of candor and good
faith, at any stage of the prosecution process, they have engaged in inequitable
conduct-knowingly deceiving the PTO about an important aspect of the
application.'"
This Note explores a proposed penalty against those who obtain patent
protection by engaging in inequitable conduct. While the current remedy
invalidates any future patent protection, it does nothing to separate the violator
from the ill-gotten gains already received through sales or licensing royalties. In
many cases, this profit can skyrocket into the millions or billions of dollars over
years of patent protection.
Without a harsher penalty, the patent applicant has more incentive to behave
deceitfully and make a hefty profit than to behave honestly and make no profit

ed. 2003).

8 MERGES ET AL.,

supra note 7, at 113.

9 Id
1o MERGES, supra note 4, at 7.
11 Id
12 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 112.

Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 4 F.
also
13 37 C.F.Rt 1.56[a] (2000); see
Supp. 2d 477, 480 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("It is fundamental that all applicants for patents have a duty to
prosecute patent applications in the PTO with candor, good faith, and honesty.").
14 In proposed legislation before the House Judiciary Committee, the duty of candor would be
codified and heightened to a more stringent level. For more information, see H.R.J. RES. 2795,109th
Cong. (2005).
15 See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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at all. The patentee is allowed to keep his profit while the ultimate costs are
passed on to the public. This drastically skews the delicate balancing of individual
and community interests by depriving the public of the benefits of market
competition when an individual does not legitimately prove the right to
protection.
When such a lapse occurs in the patent prosecution process, and a patentee
profits from protection that was obtained illegitimately through means of
inequitable conduct, it is only logical to apply a disgorgement remedy-to take
from the patentee any wrongfully received profits.
This Note further elaborates on the mechanics of inequitable conduct and
disgorgement remedies, illustrating how the remedy is applied in other areas of
federal law. Part II.G addresses the ability of courts to equitably apply
disgorgement remedies in the absence of legislation expressly authorizing the
remedy. Finally, Part III details the steadily increasing demand for patent
protection in light of a rise in high-profile inequitable conduct cases, placing in
context the need to adopt a disgorgement remedy where inequitable conduct is
found to invalidate a patent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW OF PATENT PROTECTION

In the United States, patent protection is granted for a term of twenty years
from the date of application. 16 During this period, the patent holder has the right
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the
claimed invention. 7 Each patent application is reviewed by the PTO across five
categories: that it falls into a general area of patentable subject matter, that it is
a novel invention, that it is a useful invention, that it is non-obvious--or a big
enough improvement over previous inventions, and that it is fully described by
the applicant so that others could make and use the invention. 8 The duty of
candor imposed during the patent process applies to representations made with
respect to each of these categories.

16 MERGES ET AL., supra note

7, at 112.

17 Id
18 Id.
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B. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
1. Overview. Inequitable conduct occurs when, at any time during the patent
application process, the duty of candor is breached by a patent applicant. 9
Common types of inequitable conduct include, "affirmative misrepresentations

of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information, coupled with intent to deceive."'2
Inequitable conduct is raised as an affirmative defense, usually by a party that
has been sued by the patent holder for infringement.2 The defense amounts to
an admission of infringement, but counters with the argument that the patent was
not valid because inequitable conduct occurred during the prosecution of the
patent.
2. EstabkhsingInequitabk Conduct. The party raising the defense of inequitable
conduct must show "clear and convincing evidence that the conduct was both
material and intended."' This leads to a two-step analysis of inequitable conduct
in which the court (1) determines if the withheld information or
misrepresentations satisfy a threshold level of materiality' and then (2)
determines if the applicant's conduct shows an intent to deceive.24 If the court
finds materiality and intent to deceive," then the court must weigh the findings,

19

See David Hricik Vhere the BodiesrAre: CurrentExemplarsof Inequitabk Conductand How to Avoid

Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 288 (2004).
20 See Mokns PLC,48 F.3d at 1178; see also Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 456 F.2d 592, 599
(3d Cir. 1972) (stating that "concealment and nondisclosure may be 'evidence of and equivalent to
a false misrepresentation, because the concealment or suppression is, in effect, a representation that
what is disclosed is the whole truth' ").
21 See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1972).
22 See Mo/ns PLC,48 F.3d at 1179; see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)
(defining clear and convincing evidence as evidence "which proves in the mind of the trier of fact
an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contentions [is] highly probable").
' See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 (E.D. Va.
1998). The case states that under
Rule 56, materiality is phrased in terms of whether a misrepresentation, if
corrected, or an omitted reference, if disclosed would, itself or together with
other information, give rise to the prima facie case of unpatentability. If so, the
omitted reference or misrepresentation is material .... The omitted reference
or misrepresentation may also be material if it refutes or is inconsistent with the
applicant's patentability arguments.
24 See Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2s Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,1189 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Kingsdown Med. Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (stating that
"to satisfy the intent to deceive element of inequitable conduct, 'the involved conduct, viewed in
light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient
culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive").
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in light of the surrounding circumstances to decide whether a conclusion of
inequitable conduct is warranted. 6 "The more material the omission, the less
evidence of intent will be required in order to find that inequitable conduct has
occurred."27
3. Pleadingwith Particulariy.Many district courts have ruled that an inequitable
conduct defense must be pleaded with particularity under Federal Rule of
Procedure 9(b), which applies to fraud allegations in general.2 This means that
a plaintiff must use some "means of injecting precision and some measure of
substantiation into their allegations."'29 The rule is intended to "give notice of the
'precise misconduct' alleged," but should be applied with some flexibility.'
Federal circuit courts, citing public policy considerations, often instate the
pleading requirement to prevent the inequitable conduct defense from being used
as "[a] magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee."31 One court
further stated that "vague allegations of inequitable conduct may also be the
launching of a 'fishing expedition,' allowing the accuser to embark on wide32
ranging discovery upon a thimble full of facts."
4. Common Areas of PatentProsecutionWhen Inequitabk Conduct Occurs. Areas in
which inequitable conduct is of the greatest concern include: 1) the statutory oath
of inventorship,33 2) the citation of known relevant prior art; 3) the use of

2 Hakbuarton, 925 F.2d at 1439.
7 Baxter Int'l Health Care, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1225 (Fed. Cit. 1998) (citing
N.V. Akzo v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); but see
Haliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440 (stating that "a patentee has no obligation to disclose an otherwise
material reference if the reference is cumulative or less material than those already before the
examiner").
' See Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., No. 01 -5627, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12982, at *3 (E.D. Pa.July 16,2002) (citing Envtl. Prod. Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 951
F. Supp. 57, 60 (E.D. Pa. 1996)); seeaLro
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp.
2d 348, 360 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that a party's failure to allege inequitable conduct with
particularity was fatal to their claims).
29 Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984).
o Verizon Commc'n, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12982, at *3.
31 Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 156 F.R.D. 218,221 (N.D. Cal. 1994), vacated,902 F. Supp. 1103
(N.D.Cal. 1995) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowee Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
32

Id

See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §19.03 (2005) ("The applicant must state that
he believes himself to be the original and first inventor and that he does not know of any statutory
bars to the application for a patent, including public uses of the invention more than one year prior
to the application.').
13
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affidavits concerning the date of invention;34 and 4) the use of affidavits
presenting factual evidence on patentability.35
In National Diamond Syndicate, Inc. v. Flanders Diamond USA, Inc., the court
found that inequitable conduct occurred when the plaintiff failed to disclose
36
The
material prior art references in connection with his patent application.
court found that, in submitting a patent application for a specific design of
diamond cut, the defendant's failure to disclose the existence of the plaintiff's
similar design, which had already earned patent protection, was material. Thus,
37
the defendant's design was rendered unpatentable. The court further found the
defendant possessed at least the threshold level of intent to deceive because the
defendant chose not to disclose that he knew of the plaintiff's design, that he
knew the design was similar to his own, and that he knew the plaintiff had
obtained protection for his design.38
Such instances of failure to disclose prior art comprise the most prevalent
instances of inequitable conduct. Through the 1950s it was commonly believed
that the Patent Office was obliged to look for prior art references for each patent
application. That approach, however, changed in 1979 with the case of Beckman
Instruments,Inc. v.Chemtronics, in which the court established an affirmative duty
to cite prior relevant art.3 9 In its reasoning, the court stated that:
The Patent Office does not have full research facilities of its own,
and it has never been intended by Congress that it should. In
examining patents, the Office relies heavily upon the prior art
references that are cited to it by applicants. It is therefore evident
that our patent system could not function successfully if applicants
were allowed to approach the Patent Office as an arm's length
adversary.4'

34Id.
An applicant may seek to eliminate the item (a prior art reference) as relevant art
by carrying back his date of invention prior to the effective date of the item.
This may be done through an affidavit or declaration under Rule 131 of the
Patent and Trademark Office. The office normally accepts an affidavit that is
sufficient on its face. Because of this reliance, the area of Rule 121 affidavits is
a ripe one for application of the duty of candor and full and fair disclosure.

Id.35 See id.

§ 19.03[2].

36 Nat'l Diamond Syndicate, Inc. v. Flanders

Diamonds USA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12083,67

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
37 id.

38 Id.
3' Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1970).
4

id.
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Patent applicants are not held accountable to the PTO for information of
which they are unaware. "The applicant does not commit inequitable conduct by
failing to cite art of which he has no knowledge or which he believes in good faith
to be less
relevant than expressly considered by the Patent and Trademark
41
Office."
C. EFFECT OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

The most common effect of a finding of inequitable conduct is to render a
patent and
patent unenforceable.4 2 The unenforceability extends to the entire
43
allows others to use the information contained in such a patent.
The other remedy available in some inequitable conduct cases is an award of
attorney's fees, which are awarded at the discretion of the court.' In Monolith

PortlandMidwest Co. v. KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corp., the court reasoned that:
The party who succeeds in invalidating the unlawful patent
performs a valuable public service. It is appropriate under such
circumstances to reward the prevailing party by giving him
attorney's fees for his efforts, and it is equally appropriate to
penalize in the same measure the patentee who obtained the patent
by his wrongdoing.4 5

41 CHISUM, supra note 33, § 19.03.
42 SeeJ.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Lab., 90 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (D.N.J. 2000) (where a patentee committed
inequitable conduct by not disclosing a fictitious best mode in the prosecution of the invalid patent,
which led to successful arguments against subsequent patents sought by the company).
" SeeJ.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542
F. Supp. 933, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). The court stated that
[t]he gravamen of the fraud defense is that the patentee has failed to discharge
his duty of dealing with the examiner in a manner free from the taint of 'fraud
or other inequitable conduct.' If such conduct is established in connection with
the prosecution of a patent, the fact that the lack of candor did not directly affect
all the claims in the patent has never been the governing principle. It is the
inequitable conduct that generates the unenforceability of the patent and we
cannot think of any cases where a patentee partially escaped the consequences
of his wrongful acts by arguing that he only committed acts of omission or
commission with respect to a limited number of claims. It is an all or nothing
proposition.
Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (stating that a court may award "reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party" in "exceptional cases').
" Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288,294 (9th
Cir. 1969).
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D. DISGORGEMENT REMEDIES

Disgorgement of profits is an equitable remedy' that requires a "party" to give
up "fraudulently obtained profits. 47
The overall purpose of utilizing
disgorgement as a remedy is to "make sure that wrongdoers will not profit from
4
their wrongdoing."
The court elaborated on this goal in Admiral Corp., a trademark case in which
disgorgement of profits was awarded. 9 The court stated that:
It seems scarcely equitable, however, for an infringer to reap the
benefits of a trademark he has stolen, force the registrant to the
expense and delay of litigation, and then escape payment of
damages on the theory that the registrant suffered no loss. To
impose on the infringer nothing more serious than an injunction
when he is caught is a tacit invitation to other infringement."0
Disgorgement remedies are routinely applied in several areas of federal law,
including securities violations and infringement of copyright and trademark
protection. Examination of how and why disgorgement remedies are applied in
these areas of law can provide better understanding of the remedy's purpose and
methods of implementation.
E. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS APPLIED TO SECURITIES VIOLATIONS

Securities violations occur through a variety of dishonest behavior, ranging
from insider trading to an act of fraudulently inducing customers to make
purchases at excessive prices and pocketing the proceeds. In these cases, courts
find it important to prevent such bad actors from retaining the profits they
illegally obtained.
Disgorgement of profits is the remedy most often applied by courts deciding
cases involving securities violations."' Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act

46 See A.E. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § 9.03(2), at 9-57 (1987) ("Disgorgement is
an equitable remedy designed to deprive defendants of all gains flowing from their wrong, rather
than to compensate the victims of the fraud. The purpose of disgorgement is to deter violations by
making them unprofitable, not to make investors whole.').
41 SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995).
48 SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997).
' Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1956).

50id.

s' Katherine H. Brown, SEC Civil Remedies for Insider TradingActions under Section 10(b) of the
SecuriesExcbange Act of 1934 and Ruk 10b-5, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 679, 684 (1988).
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confers general equity powers upon the district courts and gives them the power
to order all equitable relief necessary under the circumstances. 2 s3 The
disgorgement remedy is interpreted to lie within this equitable discretion.
The goal of disgorgement remedies in securities law is to deter violations of
the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains. s' The court in
SEC v. FirstJersey Securities emphasized the significance of the disgorgement
remedy for this purpose, stating that "the deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement
action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required
to disgorge illicit profits." 5
In FirstJersey Securities, the court concluded that the defendant's withholding
of material information from customers and excessive markups in its prices of
unbundled securities amounted to securities fraud. 6 The court ordered
disgorgement of profits even though a class action suit had been settled by
defendants and stated that "since disgorgement is a method of forcing a
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched, it is unlike
an award of damages and is neither foreclosed
nor confined by an amount for
57
which injured parties were willing to settle."
The court first applied the disgorgement remedy to a securities violation in the
case of SECv. Texas GulfSuphurCo., a classic example of insider trading. There,
the court ordered disgorgement of profits where the defendants, all of whom
were directors, officers, or other employees of the company, had purchased stock
and encouraged friends and family to purchase stock in the company after the

52

15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) ("The district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder."); see also Brown, supra note 51, at 684 n.37 (citing Mills v. Elec. AutoLife Co., 396 U.S. 375,391 (1970)) (noting that the Supreme Court could not "fairly infer from 1934
Exchange Act a purpose to limit court's power to grant appropriate remedies").
51 See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996); see also SEC v.
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[Thel primary purpose of
disgorgement is not to compensate investors. Unlike damages, it is a method of forcing a defendant
to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.').
4 See FirstJersey Sec., 101 F.3d at 1474 (stating also that "the deterrent effect of an SEC
enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators were not required to
disgorge illicit profits'); see also Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000)) (stating that the purpose of federal securities laws is "to
insure investor confidence in the integrity of the national securities marker and to provide an honest
and fair securities market where all participants play by the same rules").
s FirstJersy See., 101 F.3d at 1462 (quoting SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1104 (2d Cir. 1972)).
- Id. at 1450.
s7 Id. at 1475 (citing Commonwealth Chem. See., 574 F.2d at 100, 102).
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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company located an unusually large deposit of ore.5 9 At the time of the
defendants60purchases, the company had not yet released news of the discovery to
the public.
Generally, once profits have been disgorged from a violator, the court decides
how to make an equitable distribution of the funds." When possible, courts
usually award profits to victims of the violation, but "[w]here distribution to
identifiable injured parties is not feasible62 or appropriate, the money disgorged by
the defendant is paid to the Treasury.,
F. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS APPLIED IN COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW

Both copyright and trademark law use disgorgement of profits as a remedy for
infringement of the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property.
Historically, patent law also utilized the remedy allowing patentees to obtain a
patent infringer's profits.6 ' But in 1946, Congress-concerned with issues
surrounding allocation of the infringer's profits-abolished disgorgement as a
remedy in patent law 4 Though the remedial schemes for copyright and
trademark apply disgorgement differently, they provide a good model for applying
disgorgement to cases of inequitable conduct without falling victim to the same
pitfalls confronted by early patent law.

Id. at 840.
0 See John K Robinson, Note, A Reconsideration ofthe Disgogement Remedy in T pper-Tppee Insider

59

Trading Cases, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 432, 438 (1994) (detailing the facts of the case); see also Texas
Guf Sum4hur Co., 401 F.2d at 864.
61 See SEC v. Levine, 689 F. Supp. 317,320 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that "the District Court
has
broad discretion in approving a proposal plan of distribution of such funds"), rev'd on othergrounds,
881 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1989).
62 SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
63 See Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyight, 48 EMORY L.J. 1 (1999); see also
Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1888). In Tilghman, the court ordered a disgorgement of profits
where the defendants infringed the plaintiff's process for separating fat acids from glycerine. Id at
158. The court stated that
[i]n an action at law for the infringement of a patent, the plaintiff can recover a
verdict for only the actual damages which he has sustained; and the amount of
such royalties or license fees as he has been accustomed to receive from third
persons for the use of the invention, with interest thereon from the time when
they should have been paid by the defendants... [b]ut upon a bill in equity by
the owner against infringers of a patent, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
amount of gains and profits that the defendants have made by the use of his
invention.
Id. at 143-44.
' Ciolino, supra note 63, at 55.
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1. DisgorgementAppliedto CopyrightCases. Disgorgement of profits is a remedy
favored among copyright plaintiffs. 65 Section 504(b) of the Copyright Act
expressly stipulates that "the copyright owner is entitled to recover.., any profits
of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages. 66
The two goals of applying the disgorgement of profits remedy in copyright law
are "to provide adequate compensation to the copyright holder, and to deter
67
infringement.,
After copyright infringement is established, the copyright owner must show
proof of the infringer's gross revenue.6 8 The burden then shifts to the infringer
to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work.69
Further, in copyright cases, the court must often go through a process called
apportionment of profits. Through this process, the court separates profits
gained by the infringer as a result of the copyright owner's original work from
those gained as a result of work the infringer has put into the product.7" This
system of apportionment is often described as too complicated and serves as the
main criticism of the disgorgement remedy as applied to copyright law."
The Supreme Court awarded disgorgement of profits for copyright
infringement and first addressed apportionment in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldyn Pictures
Corp.7" There, the defendants were charged with copyright infringement after they
made a movie adaptation of the plaintiff's play without obtaining the right to do
so. 3 While the court of appeals found that the defendants had "deliberately lifted
the play," they also felt that it would be unjust to give all net profits to the

65 Id. at 3.

17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2000).
Sheri A. Byrne, Note, Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon Pacific International: Double
Troubl--When do Awards ofBoth Copyright and Trademark Damages Constitute Double Recovery?, 31 U.S.F.
L. REv. 257,261 (1996) (quoting Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545,
1554 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1994) (stating that copyright damages were intended to "compensate the plaintiff and to prevent
the defendant's unjust enrichment").
8 See Ciolino, supra note 63, at 14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994)).
67

69 Id.

70 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1940).

71 See, e.g., Ciolino, supra note 63, at 3 (stating that inconsistent approaches to calculating
apportionment have created case law that is confusing and arbitrary).
72 Sheldon, 309 U.S. at 390.
73 Id.
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plaintiffs.74 The district court, relying on expert testimony, allocated twenty
percent of the profits to the plaintiffs, and the appellate court affirmed."
2. DisgorgementApplied to Trademark Cases. Disgorgement is also a common
remedy in trademark law. Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act provides for
76
and functions as an "equitable measure of
disgorgement remedies
77
compensation."
Use of disgorgement as a remedy in trademark law is based on the same goals
as those found in securities and copyright law-deterrence and the prevention of
unjust enrichment.
In the trademark context, the goal of preventing unjust enrichment is based
on traditional property law notions that no one should profit from the use of
someone else's property without their permission. Under the deterrence theory,
small trademark
courts attempt to "prevent the oppression of less sophisticated
'7 8
holders by larger, more sophisticated corporate infringers."
Similar to copyright, after trademark infringement is found, plaintiffs need to
prove only the amount of the defendant's sales to establish that they are entitled

7 Id at 397. The court noted that if the plaintiffs were given all profits, they "would receive the
profits that the 'motion picture stars' had made for the picture 'by their dramatic talent and the
drawing power of their reputations.'" Id at 398.
71 Id. at 408.
76 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). This provision states that:
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or a violation under section 1125(a) ... shall have been
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be
entitled ... to recover 1) defendant's profits, 2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and 3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and
damages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing
profits the plaintiffs shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant
must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the
court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any
sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such
amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits
is either inadequate or excessive, the court may in its discretion enter judgment
for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of
the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
Id.
77 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916).
7' Bryan M. Otake, The Continuing Viabik'y of the Deterrence Rationale in Trademark Infringement

Accountings, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 221, 228 (1998).
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to disgorgement remedies. 79 Once this is proven, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to show all elements of claimed costs or deductions.'
One key difference between the application of disgorgement in trademark and
copyright cases is that in instances of trademark violations courts do not bother
with allocating profits as in copyright cases. In contrast, courts in trademark cases
generally order that a full accounting (disgorgement) of the defendant's profits
from infringement of the mark be made.8
In Hamilton-BrownShoe Co. v. WloBros., the Supreme Court upheld a judgment
disgorging profits from the defendant shoe manufacturer for infringing the rights
of Wolf Brothers' trademarked label "American Girl." 2 The court noted that
on every principle of reason and justice the owner of the trademark
is entitled to so much of the profit as resulted from the use of the
trademark ....It is more consonant with reason and justice that
the owner of the trademark should have all the profit than that he
should be deprived of any part of it by the fraudulent act of the
defendant.8 3
A second key difference between trademark law and copyright law is that, in
trademark law, courts are more cautious in granting disgorgement and thus, may
apply a higher standard of culpability. Some courts require that "bad faith" or
"willfulness" be found before granting a disgorgement remedy. 4 In Basch v. Blue

SId. (citing The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (stating that:

[u]nder existing rules it is necessary for the complainant to prove sales and costs
with reasonable and absolute accuracy. The only persons having knowledge of
making the sales are the defendant or someone in his employ. It has seemed,
therefore, only fair and just that if the complainant proves the sales, the
defendants should be required to produce evidence of the expenses he was put
to in making such sales as an offset against the sales)).
s See Otake, supra note 78, at 231 (stating that a defendant may defeat an accounting only if he
can establish that his profits are "demonstrably not attributable to the unlawful use of his mark").
8" Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1980).
82 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916).
83 Id.at 252; see also
Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77,83 (2d Cir. 1951)
(affirming the legality of a disgorgement remedy even when there was no direct competition in the
consuming markets); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538,545 (2d Cir.
1956) (finding that a disgorgement remedy is appropriate even in areas where the infringer does not
directly compete with the trademark owner).
84 See Banff Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33,35 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that an injunction was
proper instead of applying an accounting of profits remedy because of a lack ofwillful infringement);
see also Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(stating that an accounting requires showing of willfulness).
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Coral,the court discussed the need for such a heightened sense of accountability.8"
The court noted that because disgorgement measures a defendant's gain instead
of a plaintiff's loss, the remedy could sometimes overcompensate for a plaintiffs
actual injury.8 6 The court then explained that to prevent the potential inequitable
most courts require proof of intentional
treatment of a good faith infringer,
87
misconduct by the defendant.
The Second Circuit ruled that the defendant had engaged in such conduct in
W E. Basset Co. v. Revlon, Inc.8 There, Revlon was ordered to fully disgorge profits
to Bassett for the sales of a cuticle trimmer ("Cuti-Trim") that infringed Bassett's
mark on its own trimmer ("Trim'). 8 9 The court reasoned that "[i]t is essential to
deter companies from willfully infringing a competitor's mark, and the only way
the courts can fashion a strong enough deterrent is to see to it that a company
found guilty of willful infringement shall lose all its profits from its use of the
infringing mark." 90
The court further commented that "Revlon's course of conduct over a period
of years has demonstrated a callous disregard for the rights of a competitor and
consequently it is appropriate that we
for the mandates of the federal courts;
' 91
require it to make a full accounting.
The Second Circuit ruled in Monsanto CbemicalthatPerfect Fit owed Monsanto
an "accounting"-or disgorgement-of profits.92 The court found that Perfect
Fit had deliberately infringed Monsanto's "Acrilan" trademark by selling mattress
pads falsely labeled as Acrilan-filled. 93 Noting that the defendant had been
94
unjustly enriched, the court relied on its equitable discretion to craft relief. The
court concluded that it was irrelevant that the two companies were not selling in
the same market. 95

8
16
87

George Basch Co. v. Blue-Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id at 1540.

Id.

88435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970).
89 Id. at 659.
90Id. at 664.
91 Id
92

Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 397 (2d Cir. 1965).

93 Id
94 Id

at 392.

95Id at 397.
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G. EQUITABLE POWER OF THE COURTS TO APPLY DISGORGEMENT REMEDIES

As an equitable remedy, disgorgement has been routinely imposed as a
mechanism for relief at the equitable discretion of the court even when not
specifically authorized by statute.
In Texas GulfSuohur, for example, the court first applied disgorgement of
remedies in a federal securities case based on equity.96 The opinion noted that
"the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the Government without specific
statutory authority to seek restitution, and has upheld the lower courts in the
exercise of the court's general equity powers to afford complete relief."97
Disgorgement was similarly established as a remedy for copyright violations
through the equitable discretion of the court prior to being adopted by statute.9"
In Mitchell,99 the Supreme Court went a step further stating that "unless
otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the district
court are available for the proper and complete exercise of [its equitable]
jurisdiction."'" The court further noted that since the public interest was involved
in the present case, those "equitable powers assume an even broader and more
flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake."'' 1
Finally, the Mitbellcourtemphasized the historically strong equitable powers
of courts, noting that "as this Court long ago recognized, 'there is inherent in the
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction . . . to give effect to the policy of the
legislature.' "W02
The Supreme Court in Porter v. IVarner Holding Co. similarly construed the
equitable powers of the federal courts, stating, "[p]ower is thereby resident in the
District Court, in exercising [its equitable] jurisdiction, 'to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case.' ,,Io3

9 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cit. 1971).
97 Id. at 1307.
9' See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (citing Stevens v.

Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 455 (1855)) (stating that before a statutory provision existed, recovery of
profits was allowed in copyright cases under equitable relic); see also Livingston v. Woodworth, 56
U.S. 546, 560 (1854) (stating that relief had been given according to principles of equity, not for the
purpose of punishing, but to prevent unjust enrichment).
99 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.

288 (1960).
100
Id. at 291 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).
101Mitchell, 361

U.S. at 291.

102Id. at 292 (quoting Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203 (1839)).
103328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). The court continued by stating that

[the court] may act so as to adjust and reconcile competing claims and so as to
accord full justice to all the real parties in interest.... In addition, the court may
go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable jurisdiction and

decide whatever other issues and give whatever other relief may be necessary
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III. DISCUSSION
Corporations are finding new ways to create profits through exploitation of
patent rights every day. As new avenues are created and submissions of patent
applications continue to swell, new issues of misconduct will inevitably arise.
Such misconduct will naturally center around the ways that patent applicants
obtain their new assets. Consequently, a charge of inequitable conduct before the
PTO will soon need a harsher penalty attached to curtail the impulse to withhold
or misrepresent information when such behavior could gain a company or
individual millions--and sometimes billions-in profits.
A. RISE IN DEMAND FOR PATENT PROTECTION

In today's technology-driven, information-crazed culture, patent protection is
being sought and granted in record volume and used in novel ways. Patent
application filings have been on a steady increase of six to eight percent per year
for the past twenty years with the number of applications quadrupling between
1980 and 2005.' °4
One explanation for the surge is that patent protection is now safeguarded by
extensive legislation, treaties, and a judicial system more likely to uphold patent
05
validity and to award damages when patents are infringed.'
1. Expansion of Use as a Business TooL Another explanation for the surge in
protection is that corporations have begun to utilize patents differently, seeking
them out in record numbers and incorporating them as part of their business
infrastructure. 6
7
The
IBM has led the field in patents obtained for the past eleven years.
company represents the classic example of the new attitude toward
patents-looking at a patent portfolio much more as a business asset that can be
08
exploited rather than merely as a form of legal protection.'
In addition to patenting products it plans to manufacture and sell, IBM
patents items it thinks would be useful to other companies with the intention of

under the drcumstances.
Id at 398.
10 Kevin Maney, PatentApplications soAbundant thatExaminers Can't Catch Up, USAToDAY, Sept.
21, 2005, at 3B.
105 Jorda, supra note 1.
106 Steve Lohr, LB.M. is FirstCompany to Colkct over 3,000 Patentsin a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, at C1.
107

Id

108 Id
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licensing the product to one or multiple companies.'

°9

This approach has paid off

for the technology giant, garnering IBM roughly $1.7 billion annually in income
from licensing alone."'
Another new business approach, "patent-mining," is utilized by companies like
Forgent Networks, a Texas-based corporation that has formed a business model
around selling licensing agreements for existing patents."' Forgent first enforced
its portfolio of technology patents in 2001, when it made its first deals with Sanyo

and Sony for $15 million and $16 million, respectively." '2
Forgent owns, among others, the patent for the coding behind JPEG
compression technology, the most widely used technology for storing photos in

digital cameras, scanners and personal computers on the Internet." 3 In just four
years, Forgent has collected more than $105 million by licensing the patent to
more than fifty companies."'
2. Expansion into New Industries. A relatively new player in the patent field is
American Express, whose entrance signaled an expansion of the patent explosion
into the financial services industry." Though American Express holds only fifty
registered patents-a pebble in comparison to the tech companies racing to top
three thousand new patents each year-the small amount is five times the number
of patents the company held in 1998.116 More significantly, they too have realized
that patents can be used as a powerful tool to generate licensing income over the
long term, a move described as radical in the financial services industry, a decided
newcomer to the idea of patenting for profit."7
The business method patents most often obtained in the industry only became
recognized in 1998, when the Supreme Court upheld a patent for the method of
pooling mutual fund assets in State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial

Grup,Inc."8

American Express first experimented with two licensing deals in 2001 that

garnered approximately four million dollars for the company." 9 By 2003, the

109Id
110 Id.
I L.A. Lorek, Austin Company Mines More Patent Gold as Yahoo Pays to Settk, SAN ANTONIO

EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 16, 2005, at 1E.
112
113
114

Id.

Id.
Id.

115 Tamara Loomis, Express Route, IPLAW&BUSINEss, Aug. 2005, http://iplawandbusiness.law.

com/display.php/ file= /texts/0805/amexO8O5.
116 id
117 id
11

Id; see airoState St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.

1998) (upholding patent for business method).
19 Loomis, supra note 115.
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company's intellectual property group reportedly produced "tens of millions" of
dollars in licensing revenue annually. 2 °
In 2005, American Express held third place in number of patents owned in the
financial services industry, behind Citigroup, which owns 132 patents, and Visa
International, which owns 65 patents.12'
B.

FINDINGS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT HAVE RISEN WITH PATENT NUMBERS

Accompanying the surge of patents granted has been a rise in findings of
inequitable conduct before the patent office. In 2000-2001, reported decisions
conduct. 1' 2
showed that nine patents were held unenforceable due to inequitable
and by 2003-2004, the number tripled
By 2002, the number had risen to eleven,
23
to thirty patents found unenforceable.
This increase in inequitable conduct has occurred despite measures put in
place by courts throughout the evolution of inequitable conduct to prevent
frivolous allegations. The requirement in many jurisdictions, for instance, that
inequitable conduct must be pleaded with particularity prevents many charges of
inequitable conduct from prevailing. The courts also took the step in 1992 of
raising the standard for finding materiality. 24 The previous standard required
applicants to supply information if "there was a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable examiner would have considered the information important in
deciding whether to issue a patent.', 2 The new standard narrows the range of
26
It holds
information viewed as material lessening the burden on the patentee.
information to be material only if it establishes a clear case that a claim is
2
unpatentable or refutes a position taken by the patentee.
C. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT CASE LAW

1. Hoffman-La Roche v. Promega. In 2003, a California District Court
invalidated a patent of drug maker Hoffman-La Roche for a purified enzyme

120

Id. at 2.

121

Id.

122

Andrea Kamage & Deborah Sterling, The PatentPlague: Inequitabk ConductFiningsAre on the

Rise, Vith No End in Sight, IP LAW & BUSINESS, Aug. 2005, http://iplawandbusiness.law.com/
display.php/file=/texts/0805/smartpills08O5.
123 Id.
124

Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct PersistentProblems and RecommendedSolutions,

82 MARQ. L. REv. 845, 854 (1999).
121Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cit. 1995).
126 See Hricik, supra note 19, at 291 for an in-depth look at the change of standard.
127 37 C.F.R. 1.56(a) (2003).
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known as Taq."28 Taq is used to assist in a laboratory process called polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) that is used "in genetic fingerprinting, in diagnosing diseases,
and as a basic tool in laboratory research. 1 29 Researchers use Taq to increase
efficiency in the PCR process because the enzyme is thermostable, and the steps
of the process can be repeated several times without destroying polymerase and
requiring a cooling process between steps. 30 Hoffman-La Roche sold Taq
through a joint venture with another company and licensed the rights to make
Taq to several other companies, generating approximately $80-$85 million per
year. 131
The inequitable conduct claims against Hoffman-La Roche were raised as an
affirmative defense in a suit that Hoffman filed charging Promega with selling Taq
for "purposes not covered by the licensing agreement.' 3 2 Promega countered
with the inequitable conduct defense, arguing that the Taq patent should be held
unenforceable because of lack of disclosure before the PTO. 133 The court agreed,
finding six instances of misstatements material to the prosecution of the Taq
application.TM The misleading statements included, among others, deceptive
comparisons of Taq's effectiveness compared to prior art and claims asserted
about outcomes of experiments as though they had been performed when in fact
they had not. 3 ' The District Court affirmed a lower court's ruling that "these
misstatements together, and each of them individually, were material and made
with the intent to deceive the PTO.' ' 136 By the time the Taq patent was declared
invalid, it had garnered Hoffman-La Roche sales "in the hundreds of millions of
dollars.' 37
2. Purdue Pharma v. Endo Pharmaceuticals. In a fact pattern similar to the
Hoffman-La Roche case, Purdue Pharma has been accused of committing equitable
conduct regarding prosecution of the patent for Oxycontin, a powerful narcotic
painkiller. 131 Sales of Oxycontin began slowly in its first year, totaling only $200
million, but since its second year on the market, Oxycontin has averaged $1.6

"~ Teresa Riordan, Who FirstIdentified a Ky Enzyme in Biotech Research?Hoffman-LaRoche HasMony

on It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1996, at D2.
129

id

'' Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
131Riordan, supra note 128.

Id.
Hoffman-La Roche, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
13 Id. at 1015.
135 Id.
136 id
137Kamage & Sterling, supra note 122.
13' Purdue Pharma v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 410 F.3d 690 (Fed. Cir. 2005), withdraon Purdue
132

13

Pharma v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cit. 2006).
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billion in sales each year.'39 The drug is responsible for approximately eightyzfive
percent of Purdue's revenue and represents about six million prescriptions. 4°
In 2000, generic drug makers Endo Pharmaceuticals filed an application with
the FDA and notified Purdue of its intentions to market a generic Oxycontin
product.'41 Purdue responded by filing suit against Endo for infringement of its
patent rights. 42 Endo raised the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct,
claiming that Purdue's patents were unenforceable because the company had
withheld material information and made misrepresentations during the
prosecution of Oxycontin's patent. 4 3 In 2004, the trial court found that Purdue
had indeed engaged in inequitable conduct.' 4 The trial court based its findings
on claims made about the effectiveness of Oxycontin that were represented as
though they were based on quantitative research, when in fact
they were based on
145
the mere insights of a scientist working for the company.
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals confirmed the ruling before withdrawing
its opinion in 2006 and remanding it to the lower courts.' 46 Because Purdue's
misrepresentations were more implied than express in nature, the appellate court
ordered the lower court to determine if the high
standard of materiality had been
48
satisfied. 47 The case is currently pending.1
3. Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd.
Finally, in 2005, the court found inequitable conduct in Bruno Independent
Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Services, Ltd. where the stairlift manufacturer
failed to submit information to the patent office indicating that its stairlift design
was substantially similar to other designs already on the market. 4 9 The court
found the lapse to be material and awarded attorney's fees to the opposing party

139 Hurtado v. Purdue Pharma Co., 800 N.Y.S.2d 347 (2005); Glenn Singer, IvaxEntersO.xycontin

Fry: 'AutboriZedGenetic' on Way to Market, SUN-SENTINEL, June 9, 2005, at 3D.
140 Jeff Holtz, Rukng Forces Copany to Cut Jobs in Stamford, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 14CN.
141 Purdue, 410 F.3d at 692.
142 Id.
143 id.

144 Id. at 693, 704.
145 Id. at 695. The court characterized Purdue Pharma's behavior as

a "clear pattern of
misdirection," including "carefully chosen language" throughout the prosecution process. Id.
'" Purdue Pharma v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
147 Id. at 1133.
14 In another similar case rooted in the pharmaceutical industry, Eli Lilly reached a settlement
with Barr Laboratories in 1999 regarding claims of inequitable conduct in its prosecution of the
highly-lucrative Prozac patent. Courtenay Edelhart, il'5, Ivals Settk on Proac Patent, INDIANAPOIS

NEWS, Jan. 25,1999; see also PaulJ. Heald, Mowing the Playing Fielk Addressing Informajion Distortion and
Aymmetty in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249,284 (2003).
149 Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Serv., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir.

2005).
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in addition to invalidating the stairlift patent, which had been in effect since
1993."0
D. PROPOSED REMEDY: DISGORGE PROFITS WHEN INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IS
FOUND IN PROSECUTION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS

Disgorgement of profits is a remedy notable for its effectiveness at deterring
violations of the law and preventing the unjust enrichment of those who behave
deceitfully. Disgorgement is routinely used in securities cases to prevent
dishonest investors from retaining the benefits of obtaining large sums of money
through dishonest practices.'
In the intellectual property arena, disgorgement of profits is used to discourage
violation of trademark and copyright protection. Though such instances are not
exact parallels to the actions taken by those who engage in inequitable conduct
during patent prosecution, they demonstrate that courts may effectively apply a
disgorgement remedy in the intellectual property arena.
1. Amendment of Patent Statute. The most direct way for disgorgement of
profits to become a remedy to acts of inequitable conduct would be for Congress
to stipulate it by law. The timing for such a move is ripe, if unlikely. Not only
has patent protection hit an all-time high, but the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property is currently considering House
Bill 2795, also known as "The Patent Act of 2005," which proposes sweeping
changes to the patent system." 2
Unfortunately with regard to inequitable conduct, the bill proposes taking the
evaluation of such misconduct out of the hands of the courts and, instead,
In effect, this will make the defense of
relegating the task to the PTO.'
unenforceability for inequitable conduct obsolete unless such conduct rises to the
level of fraud."M
2. Appcation of the Remedy by Courts of Equiy. The more likely way for

disgorgement to be applied to cases of inequitable conduct would be for courts
to use their equitable discretion to implement the remedy.

's
's'
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Kamage and Sterling, supra note 122; see also Bruno Indep. LitingAids, 394 F.3d 1348.
See Brown, supra note 51, at 684.
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), availabk at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl09:H.

1.2795:.
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Such a move may leave no alternative but to attempt an action for antitrust liability, which is

difficult to prove. When a party chooses to seek antitrust liability, they must prove a heightened
threshold of intent and materiality in addition to proving all of the elements of a monopoly under
the Sherman Antitrust Act. For further information on such actions, see Valker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,177 (1965).
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Section 283 of the Patent Act permits a court to grant equitable relief as a
remedy for infringement. 5' The Act states "the several courts having jurisdiction
of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles
of equity to prevent the violation5 6of any right secured by patent, on such terms
as the court deems reasonable."'
Further, in all areas of federal law evaluated in this Note, courts of equity led
the way in granting disgorgement remedies before any legislation codified such
judicial authority. Accordingly, it would be natural for courts to again lead the
charge by applying disgorgement remedies to findings of inequitable conduct.
3. SuggesionsforaSmooth Transition. For a disgorgement remedy to be applied
effectively to inequitable conduct cases with few complications, it should be
patterned after the implementation of the remedy in trademark law.
First, measures should be taken to avoid the pitfalls of the apportionment
scheme used in copyright cases. The simplest application would mandate that no
portion of the ill-gotten profits be retained by the party that engaged in
inequitable conduct.
Second, the act of inequitable conduct encompasses in it an element of
willfulness through its threshold requirement of intent to deceive. This
heightened level of culpability ensures that only bad actors will be forced to
disgorge profits, lessening the potential for an overly harsh penalty to be applied
to someone who made a mistake in good faith.
IV. CONCLUSION

The rapid growth in demand for patent protection shows no sign of slowing.
In 2005, the PTO's commissioner for patents hired 940 new examiners and stated
15 7
that he plans to hire an additional 1,000 examiners each year for "several years.'
The intellectual property group at American Express has filed ninety-one new
patent applications, hoping to garner more profits through patent assets and to
take the lead in number of patents held by a financial services corporation.15 8 In
July 2004, Bill Gates announced plans to step up Microsoft's procurement of
patents and set the goal of fling fifty percent more patent applications and
59
obtaining three thousand patents in a twelve-month span.
As patents become more integral to the infrastructure of corporate profits,
some corporations will inevitably engage in dubious business practices for the
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Maney, supra note 104.
..
8 Loomis, supra note 115.
159 Steve Lohr, Pursuing Growth, Microsoft Steps Up Patent Chase, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at C3.
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prospect of making a profit. Maneuvering similar to that seen in securities
violations is likely to seep into the arena of patent prosecution if no penalty to
dissuade such behavior is in place.
As it has in other areas of federal law, recognizing a disgorgement remedy in
cases where inequitable conduct is found in the prosecution of a patent
application will serve to deter patent applicants from engaging in such conduct.
Additionally, such a remedy would prevent unjust enrichment of those who gain
profits through dishonest conduct.
Finally, a disgorgement remedy applied to inequitable conduct would serve the
age-old balancing act between the rights of individuals and the good of society.
The remedy would penalize those who are unjustly enriched when they obtain an
illegitimate license to inhibit the free flow of information.
ALLISON PRuITr
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